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TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [SO](#) [AU](#)
SUBJECT: AU MILITARY STAFF QUESTIONS PLAN FOR IGASOM
DEPLOYMENT TO SOMALIA

REF: ADDIS ABABA 2389 (NOTAL)

11. (SBU) SUMMARY AND COMMENT. On August 28, the African Union's Military Staff Committee (MSC), comprised of defense attaches or other military representatives of each of the 15 members of the AU Peace and Security Council, reviewed the proposed deployment plan for an IGAD peace support operation (IGASOM) in Somalia. The MSC's review followed the presentation of the plan to AU PSC permreps on August 25 by Kenyan PermRep to the AU Ambassador Francis Espilla (reftel).

In a written report, a copy of which was obtained by the Embassy of Sweden, the MSC highlights a number of concerns, including:

- the proposed mission's mandate is "scanty and ambiguous," as it remains unclear whether IGASOM would focus on aggressive peace enforcement (e.g., as under Chapter VII of the UN Charter) or on more passive peace-keeping;
- the concept of operations (CONOPS) calls for deploying 4 infantry battalions in Baidoa, and another 4 battalions in Mogadishu, but none to any other areas in Somalia, raising concerns about force protection and "an open flank for the ICU to exploit;"
- the proposed mission structure lacks details (e.g., currently does not include any military observers or civilian police);
- the proposed USD 196 million budget lacks detailed justification.

12. (SBU) The MSC's frank observations suggest that AU members are applying lessons learned from the beleaguered AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS), as the MSC calls for the establishment of a joint operations center for effective coordination of mission components; suggests that "the substantial part of the force and funding should be secured" prior to initial deployment;" and advises that "lessons should be drawn from ... past missions and operations". The MSC's report concludes that the deployment plan "requires to be redrafted." END SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

13. (U) BEGIN TEXT.

REPORT BY THE MILITARY STAFF COMMITTEE ON IGASOM DEPLOYMENT
PLAN HELD ON 28 AUGUST 2006

INTRODUCTION

¶1. The Military Staff Committee (MSC) held a meeting on Monday, 28 August 2006, to discuss the IGASOM Deployment Plan that was presented to the Peace and Security Council on 25 August 2006 by Mr. Francis Espilla, the Kenyan Ambassador to the AU, with the view to providing the PSC with the requisite technical advice to enable the Council (to) make informed decisions on the deployment plan. Representatives of IGAD who took part in the preparation of the plan, were invited to present the plan and also to shed more light on certain areas, but were unable to attend the meeting. The MSC therefore went ahead to discuss the plan without any further input from IGAD.

¶2. The MSC took note of the time and effort put in by IGAD in drafting the deployment plan, as well as its political will and enthusiasm to deploy IGASOM at the earliest possible time. The Committee was particularly happy to note that much effort had been made since the last meeting of the IGAD Chiefs of Defense Staff, to operationalise the Command and Control Structure of the Mission, at both the strategic and operational levels. However, the MSC argued that the plan lacks depth in some areas and contains some inconsistencies that will make it unworkable.

AIM

¶3. The aim of this report is to determine the feasibility, risks and implications as well to identify major unclear areas of the deployment plan that are likely to affect its usefulness for implementation.

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MAJOR OBSERVATIONS

¶4. The Mission Mandate. It was noted that the statement of the mission mandate was scanty and ambiguous. There is need to expand it and also to indicate clearly whether it is a Peacekeeping or a Peace Enforcement Mission. This may resolve the inconsistencies between the mandate and the concept of operation.

¶5. Current Situation. The current situation paragraph needs to be reviewed to reflect the situation in Somalia at the time of preparing the deployment plan.

¶6. Assumptions.

a. The assumption that 'Deployment of IGASOM will be based on consensus in Somalia' downplays the concerns of the ICU, which is one of the two parties identified in the Somali conflict.

b. The assumption that the mission will be funded appears to be hanging. It may be recast to read 'The international community will support and fund the mission'.

¶7. Concept of Operation. The concept of operations envisages an 8 (eight) infantry battalion operation in a 2-Phase Deployment. Phase I covers the deployment of 4 reinforced infantry battalions in the Baidoa area, one battalion at a time. There is no indication of the duration between the deployment of these battalions. Phase II covers the deployment of 4 additional battalions into the Mogadishu area. The deployment is thus restricted to only some portions of Southern Somalia. The concept does not also put the transition of IGASOM to an AU mission into perspective. The implications here are that:

a. Troops stand the chance of being defeated piece meal. They may not be able to defend themselves in the face of hostilities.

- b. Troops deployed during Phase I may not be effective on the ground, thus complicating security issues and making subsequent Phases difficult to undertake.
- c. The AU may be pressurized (sic) to supplement the force during Phase I if that force is to survive and make a meaningful impact on the ground.
- d. Deployment only to Southern Somalia will leave an open flank for the ICU to exploit, further complicating security issues.
- e. It would be difficult for the AU to determine its responsibilities and make adequate preparations, especially in terms of force generation, if the issue of the transition is not clarified. This is likely to create an operational gap.

¶18. Use of Force and Rules of Engagement. It has been provided for under the Use of force and Rules of engagement that 'Force will also be used in carrying out the mandate'. This underscores the need to deploy, particularly in Phase I, in strength and in force.

¶19. The Mission Structure. While the Mission Structure at Annex K has omitted some components, it also lacks details in some aspects. The structure needs to be expanded to include:

- a. Military Observers.
- b. The structure under the command of the CIVPOL Commissioner.
- c. A Joint Operations Centre for effective coordination of the mission components and efficient use of scarce resources.
- d. Appendices indicating details/strength of personnel under each component/sub-component and also the structure and

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details of a generic battalion are needed.

¶10. The Budget.

- a. The plan does not contain sufficient details to justify a budget of USD 196m.
- b. Multiplying the cost of deployment and maintenance of one battalion by the total number of battalions to be deployed in Phase I is quite unrealistic, as not all the battalions will be deployed at the same time.
- c. The request of USD 18.5m 'Priority Fund' requires justification.

¶11. Deployment Time Line. The deployment time line does not seem achievable under the circumstances. This requires to be reviewed.

RECOMMENDATIONS

¶12. The Committee recommends that:

- a. The MSC in principle supports the deployment plan, however it requires to be redrafted, taking into consideration the observations made in the report from paragraph 4 to 11.
- b. The substantial part of the force and funding should be secured before Phase I deployment in order to avoid issues of insufficient funds in the middle of operations.
- c. The Committee is of the view that lessons should be drawn from the past missions and operations, with the special emphasis from the Darfur Mission.

END TEXT.
WILGUS